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The last thing we may want to do is read Boston [Marathon 
bombing] suspect Miranda Rights telling him to ‘remain 
silent.’ . . . If captured, I hope [the] Administration will at least 
consider holding the Boston suspect as enemy combatant for 
intelligence gathering purposes.1 
[The Boston Marathon Bombing] is Exhibit A of why the homeland 
is the battlefield.2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Boston Marathon bombing, along with the prior “shoe”3 
“underwear”4 and “Times Square”5 bombers, has prompted debate6 
																																																																																																																																
 1. Lindsey Graham, @GrahamBlog, TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com/ 
GrahamBlog (Apr. 19, 2013 at 4:40 PM and 4:33 PM), cited in Aaron Blake, Lindsay 
Graham: Boston Bomber Could Be Held as Enemy Combatant, WASH. POST 
POLITICS BLOG (Apr. 19, 2013, 5:49 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2013/04/19/lindsey-graham-boston-bomber-could-be-held-as-enemy-
combatant. 
 2. Jennifer Rubin, Sen. Lindsey Graham: Boston Bombing “Is Exhibit A of Why 
the Homeland Is the Battlefield”, WASH. POST RIGHT TURN BLOG (Apr. 19, 2013, 
4:44 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2013/04/19/sen-
lindsey-graham-boston-bombing-is-exhibit-a-of-why-the-homeland-is-the-battlefield/ 
(quoting Telephone Interview by Jennifer Rubin with Lindsey Graham, Sen., S.C. 
(Apr. 19, 2013)). 
 3. United States v. Reid, 211 F. Supp. 2d 366, 366 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 4. United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 10-20005, 2011 WL 4345243, at *1 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 16, 2011) (denying the motion of the accused to suppress statements he 
made to law enforcement officials while at the University of Michigan hospital, and 
finding that the questioning of the accused by law enforcement before the recitation 
of Miranda rights fell within the public safety exception). 
 5. See Complaint, United States v. Shahzad, No. 10CR00928, 2010 WL 1759461 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 6. See David Ashenfelter & Tresa Baldas, Judge’s Ruling on Miranda Rights in 
Underwear Bomber Terrorism Case Touches Off Legal Debate, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.freep.com/article/20110916/NEWS06/109160374/ 
Judge-s-ruling-Miranda-rights-underwear-bomber-terrorism-case-touches-off-legal-
debate; Richard Brust, Probing Questions: Experts Debate the Need to Create 
Exceptions to Rules on Coerced Confessions, A.B.A. J. (June 1, 2012), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/probing_questions_experts_debate_the_
need_to_create_exceptions; Bernard Gwertzman, Shahzad Arrest Ignites Liberties 
Debate, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 7, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-
the-law/shahzad-arrest-ignites-liberties-debate/p22073; Charlie Savage, Debate Over 
Delaying Miranda Warning, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20. 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/04/21/us/a-debate-over-delaying-suspects-miranda-rights.html?_r=0. 
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on the applicability of traditional criminal procedure principles to 
counterterrorism investigations and prosecutions.  Much of the 
discussion focuses on the efficacy and even appropriateness of 
applying the public safety exception to the Miranda rights warning 
requirement.  What is missing is underscored by Senator Graham’s 
comments—the possibility of indefinite detention and trial by military 
commission fundamentally alters the implicit balance within the 
public safety exception. 
In New York v. Quarles, the Supreme Court created what has 
come to be known as the Public Safety Exception (PSE) to the 
Miranda warning and waiver requirement: when a police questions a 
suspect in custody in response to an imminent threat of danger to the 
officer or the public, the confession will be admissible even if the 
officer failed to provide Miranda warnings and obtained a waiver.7  In 
her opinion in Quarles, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
Justice O’Connor reminds us that Miranda does not prohibit public 
safety questioning; Miranda simply restricts using the statement as 
evidence.8  In essence, Miranda requires the government to make a 
choice—question a suspect without first advising them of the Miranda 
rights and obtaining a waiver of those rights in order to protect the 
public, or advise the subject and seek a waiver to protect a future 
prosecution.  This Article challenges whether that choice remains 
valid. 
Implicit in that formulation is that failing to advise a suspect 
questioned in a custodial setting of their Miranda rights may result in 
the government foregoing the opportunity to incapacitate the 
individual.9  This Article posits that the alternative “remedies” of 
indefinite detention and trial by military commission fundamentally 
alter the equation Justice O’Connor laid out in Quarles.  This 
alternative option for incapacitating a suspected terrorist operative 
may, in certain situations (potentially even involving a U.S. citizen), 
eliminate the binary “warn and risk imminent danger, or don’t warn 
and risk the ability to prosecute” choice equation that was central to 
the Quarles decision. 
																																																																																																																																
 7. 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984). 
 8. Id. at 664 (“Miranda has never been read to prohibit the police from asking 
questions to secure the public safety . . . . When police ask custodial questions 
without administering the required warnings, Miranda quite clearly requires that the 
answers received be presumed compelled and that they be excluded from evidence at 
trial.”). 
 9. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
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Instead, the burden of risk associated with counter-terrorism 
questioning has substantially shifted to the terrorism suspect.  Unlike 
the response options available to government law enforcement and 
prosecution agents prior to September 11, 2001, the government does 
not necessarily risk the ability to successfully prosecute (due to 
inadmissibility of the confession)—and thereby incapacitate—the 
terrorist suspect if a violation of Miranda results in inadmissibility of 
the suspect’s confession.  Rather, the government may now both 
question in violation of the Miranda warning and waiver requirement 
and then incapacitate the suspect through indefinite detention and/or 
alternatively prosecute via a legislatively created military commission 
employing perpetually evolving, and less rigorous procedures, than an 
Article III court.10 
This Article argues that expanding the scope of the PSE to allow 
for more extensive interrogation of terrorism suspects will inure to 
the suspects’ benefit.  It will arguably incentivize the normal law 
enforcement disposition for suspected terrorist suspects, and thereby 
mitigate the likelihood that such suspects will be subjected to military 
administrative detention.  This in turn will enhance the probability of 
finding resolution in an Article III court, rather than of subjecting the 
suspects to indefinite detention or trial by a military commission. 
Part I juxtaposes the well-established Miranda holding against the 
dilemma of interrogating terrorism suspects.  Part II then discusses 
Quarles and explains how public safety does not always equate to 
protecting the public.  Part III explores indefinite detention and 
military commission alternatives to traditional prosecution in an 
Article III court.  Part IV then explains how those alternatives 
undermine the Quarles equation.  Part V reconciles expanding the 
Quarles PSE with Miranda, focusing on the risk of police calculation 
and then by analogizing.  Part V then draws support for an expanded 
PSE by analogizing it with the special needs exceptions to the warrant 
and probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 
illustrating how an objective critique of the primary purpose of police 
questioning can effectively regulate the applicability of an expanded 
PSE.  Part VI then outlines the contours of the proposed expansion of 
the PSE.  Part VII concludes by detailing how such an expansion 
would incentivize the Article III court prosecution option and 
constitute a net gain for terror suspects. 
By focusing on actual voluntariness, an expanded PSE would be 
consistent with the trend in the Supreme Court’s Miranda 
																																																																																																																																
 10. See infra Part III. 
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jurisprudence so long as the statement is actually voluntary. 
 Ultimately, the price of denying the government critical counter-
terrorism information and the risk of subjecting the suspect to 
unwarned questioning with subsequent preventive, indefinite, 
detention (because the statement is inadmissible) is not worth the 
benefit of compliance with a mere prophylactic rule, so long as the 
court validates that the statement was in fact voluntary. 
I.  MIRANDA, PUBLIC SAFETY, AND THE TERRORISM 
INTERROGATION DILEMMA 
Few Supreme Court decisions in our nation’s history have 
generated more controversy than Miranda v. Arizona.11  In Miranda, 
the Supreme Court concluded that the then-existing due process 
“totality of the circumstances” test for assessing when a confession 
was actually coerced was insufficient to protect individuals from the 
inherently coercive environment of custodial interrogation.12  The 
Court then concluded that this necessitated the imposition of a rights 
warning requirement to offset this inherent coercion.13  Furthermore, 
whenever an individual was subjected to custodial interrogation, the 
government would bear the “heavy burden” of proving a knowing 
and voluntary waiver of these noticed rights.14  This combined 
warning and waiver requirement would establish that the suspect’s 
statement was not the product of this inherent coercion, thereby 
restoring confidence that the statement or confession was the product 
of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination.15  Accordingly, a suspect’s statements, both inculpatory 
and exculpatory,16 obtained during custodial interrogation would be 
																																																																																																																																
 11. 384 U.S. 436; see, e.g., James Oliphant & David S. Savage, Controversy Over 
Miranda Warnings for Terrorism Suspect, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2010, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/May/05/nation/la-na-ny-bomb-legalities-20100506. 
 12. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
 13. Id. at 467–68. 
 14. Id. at 475. 
 15. Id. at 471–72. 
 16. Id. at 476–77.  The Court explained: 
The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our 
opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, 
prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.  No 
distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions 
and statements which amount to ‘admissions’ of part or all of an offense.  
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being 
compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish 
degrees of incrimination.  Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no 
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admissible only when the government established a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the required Miranda rights.17  Furthermore, 
effective waiver required police to prove that they informed the 
suspect of a series of rights articulated by the Court, rights that are 
today a ubiquitous aspect of American culture.18  According to the 
decision, 
 To summarize, we hold that, when an individual is taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in 
any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege 
against self-incrimination is jeopardized.  Procedural safeguards 
must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully 
effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of 
silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be 
scrupulously honored, the following measures are required.  He 
must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to 
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a 
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and 
that, if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him 
prior to any questioning if he so desires.  Opportunity to exercise 
these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.  
After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded 
him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these 
rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.  But 
unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the 
prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation 
can be used against him.19 
Miranda therefore established a presumption-based rule of 
admissibility: statements made absent a valid waiver are presumed 
involuntary and therefore inadmissible; statements made following 
waiver, however, are presumed voluntary and are admissible.20  
Nevertheless, only one of these presumptions was conclusive: the 
presumption of involuntariness.21  The Miranda opinion provided for 
no exception to the exclusion of statements obtained absent valid 
waiver.22  In contrast, statements preceded by such a waiver, while 
																																																																																																																																
distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements 
alleged to be merely “exculpatory.” 
Id. 
 17. Id. at 444; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000). 
 18. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443 (“Miranda has become embedded in routine police 
practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.”). 
 19. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79. 
 20. Id. at 458. 
 21. See id. at 478–79. 
 22. See id. at 479. 
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presumptively voluntary, might still be excluded if actually coerced in 
violation of due process.23 
From inception, the conclusive involuntariness presumption and 
accordant exclusion triggered by a Miranda violation generated 
criticism.  Contrary to initial dire predictions, however, the ruling 
never produced a debilitating effect on law enforcement.24  Indeed, 
Miranda evolved to provide a net gain to law enforcement: police 
practices became more professional; extremely high waiver rates (in 
the range of eighty to ninety percent)25 meant police continued to 
elicit confessions; the presumption of voluntariness resulting from 
waiver, while not conclusive, made due process challenges infrequent 
and almost impossible to sustain.26 
In 2000, the Supreme Court accepted the case of Dickerson v. 
United States.27  In Dickerson, the Fourth Circuit held that Congress 
had properly superseded Miranda with a statute establishing a totality 
of the circumstances voluntariness test as the touchstone for 
confession admissibility.28  Dickerson teed up the opportunity to 
overrule Miranda, a rule the Court had previously held swept more 
broadly then the privilege against self-incrimination itself.29  In an 
opinion written by the Chief Justice, a seven-justice majority declined 
this opportunity, upholding the core Miranda rule.30  The Court 
emphasized that Miranda had not produced the debilitating impact on 
law enforcement originally predicted, and as a result there was no 
																																																																																																																																
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (warning that the decision would “entail[] 
harmful consequences for the country at large”). 
 25. Anthony J. Domanico et al., Overcoming Miranda: A Content Analysis of the 
Miranda Portion of Police Interrogations, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2012) (an analysis of 
the Miranda portion of a sample of electronically recorded interrogations revealed 
that more than ninety percent of suspects waived their Miranda rights and spoke with 
police); Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of 
Contemporary Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 792 (2006) 
(“[M]odern studies demonstrate that roughly eighty percent of suspects waive their 
Miranda rights and talk to the police.” (citation omitted)). 
 26. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443–44.  The Court explained: 
[O]ur subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on 
legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling that 
unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution’s case 
in chief . . . . [C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument 
that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the 
law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare. 
Id. 
 27. 530 U.S. 428, 431–32 (2000). 
 28. See id. at 431–32. 
 29. See Oregon v. Elstadt, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985). 
 30. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444. 
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compelling reason to deviate from stare decisis and overturn the 
decision.31 
Dickerson attributed the Court’s adjustments to the original 
Miranda rule in a series of post-Miranda decisions to the fact that no 
rule, even a constitutional rule, is immutable.  The Court also 
suggested that these adjustments to the scope of the original Miranda 
rule supported the conclusion that the tailored rule that emerged 
from these prior decisions served a legitimate constitutional purpose 
without a serious cost of over-breadth.32 
The first of these adjustments was the Court’s endorsement of what 
came to be known as the public safety exception to Miranda.  In New 
York v. Quarles, the Court held that statements made in response to 
police questions motivated by a primary public or police safety 
interest, even if made while in custody, do not implicate the concerns 
that resulted in the Miranda decision.33  Accordingly, these statements 
are admissible even without complying with Miranda’s warning and 
waiver requirement.34 
As will be explained in more detail below, the precise scope of the 
Quarles PSE has never been totally clear.  Was it sine qua non 
spontaneity in the face of an imminent threat?  Or was it a primary 
objective of defusing that imminent threat?  When the FBI 
questioned Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on December 25, 2009 
based on his apparent effort to ignite a bomb he concealed in his 
underwear during a transatlantic airline flight, this uncertainty came 
into sharp focus.35  FBI agents conducted this questioning at the 
hospital where Abdulmutallab was being treated for burns resulting 
from his failed attempt.36  The agents had been informed by Customs 
and Border Patrol agents of the attempt and that Abdulmutallab had 
been taken into custody at the airport.  The questioning obviously 
occurred some time after the arrest, and lasted for approximately fifty 
minutes.37  According to the district court’s ruling denying 
Abdulmutallab’s motion to suppress his statements: 
[Defendant was asked] where he traveled, when he had traveled, 
how, and with whom; the details of the explosive device; the details 
																																																																																																																																
 31. Id. at 443–44. 
 32. See id. at 442. 
 33. 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984). 
 34. See id. at 657–58. 
 35. United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 10-20005, 2011 WL 4345243, at *2–4 
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2011). 
 36. Id. at *1. 
 37. Id. at *1. 
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regarding the bomb-maker, including where Defendant had received 
the bomb; his intentions in attacking Flight 253; who else might be 
planning an attack; whether he associated with, lived with, or 
attended the same mosque with others who had a similar mind-set as 
Defendant about jihad, martyrdom, support for al-Qaeda, and a 
desire to attack the United States by using a similar explosive device 
on a plane, and what these individuals looked like—all in an attempt 
to discover whether Defendant had information about others who 
could be on planes or about to board planes with explosive devices 
similar to the one Defendant used because, based upon his training, 
experience, and knowledge of earlier al-Qaeda attacks, this was not 
a solo incident and the potential for a multi-prong attack existed 
even if Defendant was unaware of any specific additional planned 
attack.38 
The trial court denied Abdulmutallab’s motion, concluding that 
this questioning fell within the Quarles public safety exception.39  
Before his motion was even filed, however, the issue of applying the 
public safety exception to the questioning of suspected terrorists 
triggered a significant debate.40  This debate was sparked not only by 
news reports of Abdulmutallab’s questioning without a Miranda 
warning or waiver, but also by Attorney General Eric Holder’s 
statement that the government might ask Congress to provide 
statutory authority for such unwarned questioning in future situations 
in order to bolster the government’s legal posture.41  Holder asserted 
in numerous forums, including in his testimony before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, that the public safety exception should be 
clarified to provide federal agents with necessary flexibility to permit 
unwarned questioning of terror suspects for sufficient duration to 
achieve their primary preventive purpose.42 
																																																																																																																																
 38. Id. at *5 
 39. Id. at *6 (“The circumstances present at the time of Defendant’s questioning 
fall within the public safety exception to Miranda recognized in Quarles.”). 
 40. See Terry Frieden, Holder: Handling of Would-Be Bomber Consistent with 
Past Policy, CNN (Feb. 3, 2010, 5:21 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/ 
02/03/holder.terror.charges/index.html. 
 41. See Anne E. Kornblut, Obama Administration Looks Into Modifying 
Miranda Law in the Age of Terrorism, WASH. POST, May 10, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/09/AR2010050902062.html. 
 42. See  Oversight of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Hearing Before the Committee on 
the Judiciary United States Senate, 111 Cong. (2010) (questioning of Eric Holder, 
Att’y Gen. of the United States); see also Kornblut, supra note 41; Hanna F. Madbak, 
Attorney General Holder to Engage Congress to Legislate on Miranda, N.Y. ST. B. 
ASS’N (May 31, 2010, 10:46 AM), http://nysbar.com/blogs/ExecutiveDetention/ 
2010/05/attorney_general_holder_to_eng_1.html. 
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The debate triggered by this proposal has focused almost 
exclusively on the scope of the original Quarles exception and the 
efficacy of the exception when restrictively interpreted.43  Opponents 
to an expanded temporal scope argue that the threat of terrorism 
cannot be permitted to dilute core constitutional protections.44  In an 
era where terrorism is viewed as a threat to both the safety of the 
country and the liberties established by our Constitution, this is 
unsurprising.  What is absent from this debate, however, is an 
assessment of the options available to the government when 
confronting terrorist suspects taken into custody, and how those 
options impact an assessment of the relative merits of an expanded 
public safety exception. 
Abdulmutallab’s case is instructive.  When taken into custody in 
Detroit,45 government officials did not possess just one criminal law 
enforcement response option.  Instead, like any other individual 
suspected of being a member of or associated with al-Qaeda, the 
government had two distinct response options to choose from in 
order to incapacitate Abdulmutallab.  The first option was federal 
criminal process.  This is the option the government obviously 
selected—an option that ultimately proved effective.46  However, by 
questioning Abdulmutallab without first obtaining a Miranda waiver, 
the government assumed risk that his statements would be 
inadmissible.  This appears to have been a calculated risk, because 
unlike the facts of Quarles, there was nothing spontaneous about the 
questioning.47  Thus, when FBI agents conducted that questioning, 
they confronted the traditional risk continuum resulting from the 
Quarles decision: either the statements would fall within the public 
safety exception and be admissible, or they would not and could not 
be used in the government’s case in chief.  The latter outcome might 
not prevent Abdulmutallab’s prosecution, but it would certainly make 
it more difficult. 
																																																																																																																																
 43. See Joanna Wright, Note, Mirandizing Terrorists? An Empirical Analysis of 
the Public Safety Exception, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1296 (2011). 
 44. See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Creating an Exception to an Exception—Too 
Dangerous and Too Unwarranted, JURIST (Apr. 2, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/ 
2011/04/creating-an-exception-to-an-exception.php. See generally Rorie A. Norton, 
Note, Matters of Public Safety and the Current Quarrel Over the Scope of the 
Quarles Exception to Miranda, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (2010). 
 45. United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 10-20005, 2011 WL 4345243, at *1 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 16, 2011). 
 46. See id. at *6 
 47. See id. 
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Because of the advent of terrorist “enemy belligerent detention” 
associated with the U.S. military response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the government had an alternate option to 
incapacitate Abdulmutallab: designate him an unprivileged enemy 
belligerent (UEB) and transfer him to the detention facility at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for long-term preventive detention, and 
perhaps trial by military commission.48  Although not invoked, a 
number of prominent lawmakers were demanding just such a course 
of action immediately following Abdulmutallab’s arrest.49 
Had the government invoked this option, concerns over Miranda 
would have been immediately nullified.  Indeed, confessing to being 
affiliated with al-Qaeda and engaging in activity intended to cause 
death or destruction to U.S. persons or property would have 
facilitated the UEB designation.  Furthermore, treating 
Abdulmutallab as an UEB would have allowed the government to 
conduct a long interrogation with no concern for Miranda 
compliance.  Instead, the only consideration would have been 
protecting any statements from an assertion that they were coerced, 
and even then this would only be relevant in the event that the 
government chose to go beyond preventive detention and pursue 
criminal prosecution before a military commission. 
This alternate option reveals that critics of extending the Quarles 
PSE to cases such as Abdulmutallab’s may not have fully 
contemplated the second order effects of a more restrictive 
application.  It is unlikely that civil libertarians would consider the 
military detention and trial option preferable to trial in an Article III 
federal court.  Accordingly, the broadened scope of the public safety 
exception applied in Abdulmutallab’s case, and advocated by the 
Attorney General, is actually an important protection for suspected 
terror operatives, for it will make the military incapacitation option 
less likely.  This is not to suggest that permitting questioning pursuant 
to the exception will guarantee the civilian criminal option.  Indeed, 
there may be cases where the statements obtained during the 
questioning will result in a decision to invoke the military option.  But 
it does seem clear that a narrowly construed application of Quarles 
will always incentivize invoking the military option from the outset of 
																																																																																																																																
 48. See 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7) (2012). 
 49. See generally Letter from Joseph I. Lieberman, Homeland Sec’y & 
Governmental Affairs Comm. Chairman, to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen. of the United 
States (Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-
media/lieberman-collins-urge-administration-to-move-abdulmutallab-into-military-
custody. 
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the investigatory response.  Such an outcome is at odds with an 
effective balance between security and liberty that is at the core of 
both Quarles, and the broader government effort to respond to the 
threat of transnational terrorism. 
II.  MIRANDA AND QUARLES: WHY PUBLIC SAFETY DOES NOT 
ALWAYS MEAN PROTECTING THE PUBLIC 
Prior to its decision in Quarles, the Supreme Court had already 
ruled that statements made in violation of Miranda could be used for 
impeachment purposes.50  This decision was based on the Court’s 
conclusion that Miranda had not been intended to arm a defendant 
with the ability to present false testimony.51  In Quarles, however, the 
Court confronted the question of whether all statements made in 
violation of Miranda were inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in 
chief, a question that seemed foreclosed by Miranda itself.52 
Quarles involved a spontaneous police questioning in response to 
the realization that the suspect of a violent sexual assault just taken 
into custody had discarded his pistol in a small bodega.53  After a 
woman approached two patrol officers and told them she had just 
been raped by a man who went into a supermarket, one officer called 
for assistance while the other, Officer Kraft, went to the supermarket 
to search for the suspect.54  Kraft spotted a man matching the 
description of the assailant as soon as he entered the store.55  The 
suspect, Benjamin Quarles, ran from Kraft towards the back of the 
market.56  Kraft lost sight of Quarles, but then saw him again and 
ordered him to stop.57  Quarles complied, and while frisking Quarles, 
Kraft realized Quarles was wearing an empty pistol holster.58  Kraft 
immediately cuffed Quarles, and then asked him where the gun was.59 
Quarles nodded towards some boxes in the supermarket and said, 
“the gun is over there.”60  Kraft then read Quarles Miranda warnings, 
																																																																																																																																
 50. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 452 (2000) (“A defendant’s 
statement taken in violation of Miranda that was nonetheless voluntary could be used 
at trial for impeachment purposes.” (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975))). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657–58 (1984). 
 53. Id. at 651–52. 
 54. Id. at 652. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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obtained a waiver, and asked Quarles additional questions.61  Quarles 
admitted the pistol was his.62 
Quarles moved to suppress both statements and the pistol prior to 
his trial.63  Quarles asserted that Miranda dictated exclusion of the 
first statement, and that the pistol and second statement were fruit of 
the unwarned first statement64 (a theory subsequently rejected by the 
Court in Oregon v. Elstad).65  The trial court’s decision to grant the 
Motion to Suppress was upheld by the intermediate appellate court 
and by the New York Court of Appeals.66  These courts both rejected 
the Government’s argument that public safety justified excusing the 
normal Miranda requirements.67 
Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed, and created the public 
safety exception to the Miranda warning and waiver requirement.68  
Early in the opinion, the Court noted that “the Miranda Court, 
however, presumed that interrogation in certain custodial 
circumstances is inherently coercive and held that statements made 
under those circumstances are inadmissible unless the suspect is 
specifically informed of his Miranda rights and freely decides to forgo 
those rights.”69  The use of the “certain circumstances” qualifier set up 
the rationale for the exception the Court created.70  The Court then 
emphasized Miranda’s original motivation: to protect suspects from 
the inherent coercion associated with custodial interrogation.71  The 
Court focused on Miranda’s extensive discussion of police ‘station 
house’ interrogation tactics, and concluded that when an officer like 
Kraft confronts an imminent danger to the public or other police 
officers—like the danger associated with a missing firearm in a 
location where confederates may be laying in wait for the police72—
																																																																																																																																
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 652–653. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 66. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652–53. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 654 (second emphasis added). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 656. 
 72. Id. at 657. (“The police in this case, in the very act of apprehending a suspect, 
were confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a 
gun which they had every reason to believe the suspect had just removed from his 
empty holster and discarded in the supermarket. So long as the gun was concealed 
somewhere in the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously 
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they will not have the opportunity to calculate tactics to coerce the 
suspect into confessing.73  Accordingly, questioning a custodial 
suspect in a situation like the type Kraft confronted is not a 
“circumstance” involving the type of inherent coercion necessary to 
trigger Miranda’s concern, and therefore compliance with Miranda is 
not a necessary predicate to admissibility.74  According to the Court, 
“[w]hatever the motivation of individual officers in such a situation, 
we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings 
of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in 
which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern 
for the public safety.”75 
Public safety, however, was not the exclusive ratio decidendi of the 
opinion.  In addition to the public safety motivation, the Court 
emphasized the questioning’s spontaneity, and how that spontaneity 
mitigated the risks associated with traditional custodial interrogation 
so central to the Miranda decision: 
In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these 
officers, where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual 
is necessarily the order of the day, the application of the exception 
which we recognize today should not be made to depend on post hoc 
findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective 
motivation of the arresting officer.76 
The Court bolstered this spontaneity factor by also emphasizing 
the immediacy of the officer’s decision-making process, and the 
imminence of the threat confronted by the officer: 
																																																																																																																																
posed more than one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, 
a customer or employee might later come upon it.”). 
 73. See id. at 656 (“In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these 
officers, where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily 
the order of the day, the application of the exception which we recognize today 
should not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing 
concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting officer.”). 
 74. See id. at 657–58 (“We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a 
situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic 
rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination. We 
decline to place officers such as Officer Kraft in the untenable position of having to 
consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask 
the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and render whatever 
probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings in 
order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly 
damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile 
situation confronting them.”). 
 75. Id. at 656. 
 76. Id. 
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We decline to place officers such as Officer Kraft in the untenable 
position of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether 
it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without 
the Miranda warnings and render whatever probative evidence they 
uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings in order to 
preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but 
possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and 
neutralize the volatile situation confronting them.77 
Quarles’s ultimate holding did not impose a strict spontaneity 
requirement.  Instead, the Court opened the door to a balancing of 
interests that might justify invoking the exception in situations far less 
spontaneous than the one Kraft confronted: 
Procedural safeguards which deter a suspect from responding were 
deemed acceptable in Miranda in order to protect the Fifth 
Amendment privilege; when the primary social cost of those added 
protections is the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda 
majority was willing to bear that cost. Here, had Miranda warnings 
deterred Quarles from responding to Officer Kraft’s question about 
the whereabouts of the gun, the cost would have been something 
more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in convicting 
Quarles. Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not simply 
to make his case against Quarles but to insure that further danger to 
the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a public 
area. 
 We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a situation 
posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the 
prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege 
against self-incrimination.78 
Subsequent application of the PSE presents a mixed bag of 
emphasis on both the imminent threat and the spontaneity aspect of 
Quarles.  It seems clear that by opening the door to a safety oriented 
balance of relative interests to justify invoking the exception, the 
Court set the conditions for its ultimate application to the suspected 
terrorist context. 
III.  THE INDEFINITE DETENTION/MILITARY COMMISSION 
ALTERNATIVE 
Confusion continues to surround, and cloud, U.S. counterterrorism 
detention policy and practice.  The confusion flows from multiple 
sources, including the difficulty in defining battlefield and 
																																																																																																																																
 77. Id. at 657–58 (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. at 657. 
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belligerents, but also inconsistent and often poorly explained U.S. 
counterterrorism policy.  Yet it is the nature and purpose of detention 
in armed conflict coupled with that policy and practice that results in 
the specter of indefinite detention and implicit nullification of 
Quarles. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in considering the detention of a U.S. 
citizen during hostilities in Afghanistan, held that “[t]he capture and 
detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial 
of unlawful combatants, by ‘universal agreement and practice,’ are 
‘important incident[s] of war.’ The purpose of detention is to prevent 
captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking 
up arms once again.”79 
Capturing or detaining a member of an enemy force is based on 
their status as such, not on an individualized assessment of their 
threat.  The law of armed conflict presumes that members of an 
enemy force “are part of the military potential of the enemy and it is 
therefore always lawful to attack [and thus to capture] them for the 
purpose of weakening that potential.”80  As the International 
Committee of the Red Cross acknowledges, “Prisoners of war may be 
interned . . . for no individual reason.  The purpose of this internment 
is not to punish them, but only to hinder their direct participation in 
hostilities and/or to protect them.”81 
Because this detention incapacitates individuals to prevent their 
return to hostilities, the detention period lasts until the cessation of 
those hostilities.82  Unlike the clearly defined end of hostilities with 
Italy, Germany, and Japan during World War II, it is unclear when 
and if the cessation of hostilities between the United States and al-
Qaeda would occur.  Therein lie the seeds for the current indefinite 
																																																																																																																																
 79. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (citation omitted).  Similarly, 
during World War II the Court stated that “[l]awful combatants are subject to 
capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces.  Unlawful 
combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are 
subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their 
belligerency unlawful.” Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942). 
 80. Marco Sassóli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where it Matters: Admissible Killing and 
Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 90 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 599, 606 (2008). 
 81. 1 MARCO SASSÓLI ET AL., HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? CASES, 
DOCUMENTS AND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, chs. 6, 10 (3d ed. 2011), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-0739-part-i.pdf. 
 82. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
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detention regimes in Guantanamo and Afghanistan.83  Today, this 
indefinite detention regime is supported by statute, originally the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”),84 and later 
through a National Defense Authorization Act.85 
A. Authorization for Use of Military Force. 
On September 14, 2001, the U.S. Congress passed the AUMF, 
which the President signed into law on September 18, 2001.86  The 
AUMF states: 
(a) IN GENERAL—That the President is authorized to use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by 
such nations, organizations or persons.87 
It was this language and its implications on detention that the 
Supreme Court addressed in Hamdi.88  The Court found that where 
Congress has permitted the use of necessary and appropriate force, 
																																																																																																																																
 83. The U.S. military’s continued detention system in Afghanistan has been 
overshadowed, understandably enough, by Guantanamo.  Ostensibly, pursuant to an 
agreement between the United States and Afghanistan, the United States has 
transferred control of detention operations to the Government of Afghanistan. See 
Memorandum of Understanding on Transfer of U.S. Detention Facilities in Afghan 
Territory to Afghanistan, U.S.-Afg., Mar. 9, 2012, available at http:// 
http://www.mfa.gov.af/en/news/7671; US Military Gives Control of Its Last Detention 
Center to Afghans, FOX NEWS (Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/25/us-military-to-hand-over-detention-
facility-to-afghan-government/.  But in what one commentator styled a “second 
Guantanamo,” the United States is continuing to detain over sixty-five third-party 
nationals, in other words, non-Afghans, in Afghanistan. Kevin Sieff, In Afghanistan, 
a Second Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/in-afghanistan-a-second-guantanamo/2013/08/04/e33e8658-f53e-11e2-81fa-
8e83b3864c36_print.html.  Sieff contends that the majority of the non-Afghan 
detainees are Pakistani and that essentially Afghanistan is allowing the United States 
to detain non-Afghans in exchange for having handed over the Afghan detainees. Id.  
These non-Afghan detainees include individuals captured in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan but also the Middle East, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Id. 
 84. See generally Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 85. See generally National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. 
L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011). 
 86. 115 Stat. 224 § 2; see Bill Summary & Status 107th Congress (2001–2002) 
S.J.RES. 23 All Information, LIBRARY CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:SJ00023:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
 87. 115 Stat. 224 § 2(a). 
 88. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 573 (2004). 
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“Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the 
narrow circumstances [of Hamdi].”89  Hamdi argued that the AUMF 
did not authorize his indefinite detention.90  The Court interpreted 
Hamdi’s objection “to be not to the lack of certainty regarding the 
date on which the conflict [with al-Qaeda] will end, but to the 
substantial prospect of perpetual detention.”91  In response, the Court 
repeated the Government’s assertion that “the detention of enemy 
combatants during World War II was just as ‘indefinite’ while that 
war was being fought.”92 
The Court then acknowledged the viability of Hamdi’s concern of 
indefinite detention in a “war on terror,” stating: 
We recognize that the national security underpinnings of the “war 
on terror,” although crucially important, are broad and malleable. 
As the Government concedes, “given its unconventional nature, the 
current conflict is unlikely to end with a formal cease-fire 
agreement.”  The prospect Hamdi raises is therefore not far-fetched. 
If the Government does not consider this unconventional war won 
for two generations, and if it maintains during that time that Hamdi 
might, if released, rejoin forces fighting against the United States, 
then the position it has taken throughout the litigation of this case 
suggests that Hamdi’s detention could last for the rest of his life.93 
Ultimately the Court ruled that under the AUMF, “[t]he United 
States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals 
legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants who engaged in an 
armed conflict against the United States.”94 
																																																																																																																																
 89. Id. at 519. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 520. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 521.  The Court’s analysis included referring to active and ongoing 
hostilities between the United States and the Taliban and that some 13,500 U.S. 
troops were deployed to Afghanistan.  What then in 2014, when, according to 
President Obama, the U.S. “war in Afghanistan will be over”? Barack Obama, 
President of the United States, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-
union-address.  With 13,500 troops in Afghanistan at the time of Hamdi, what if the 
United States has 10,000 or 5000 troops in Afghanistan after 2014?  And even if the 
United States exercises what some are calling the “zero option”—removal of all U.S. 
troops from Afghanistan—what of the U.S. Army’s claim that the United States is in 
an era of “persistent conflict”? See Mark Mazetti & Matthew Rosenberg, U.S. 
Considers Faster Pullout in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/world/asia/frustrated-obama-considers-full-troop-
withdrawal-from-afghanistan.html?pagewanted=all (describing range of U.S. 
withdrawal options from Afghanistan); see also  Strategic Context, U.S. ARMY, 
http://www.army.mil/aps/08/strategic_context/strategic_context.html (last visited Nov. 
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But the use of force (and thus detention) under the AUMF is 
limited to “those nations, organizations, or persons [the President] 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 . . . .”95  The AUMF’s 
utility seemed to wane over time, following successful operations that 
killed or captured much of al-Qaeda’s leadership, coupled with the 
post-9/11 outgrowth of al-Qaeda cells and affiliated groups in 
different parts of the world.96 
What followed is additional legislation that authorizes (or 
reaffirms) the U.S. government’s authority to indefinitely detain 
and/or prosecute via military commission members of al-Qaeda and 
associated forces who commit belligerent acts against the United 
States. 
B. National Defense Authorization Act § 1021 
To counter any gaps in the AUMF or perceptions of its diminishing 
applicability, the U.S. Congress, as part of the 2012 National Defense 
Authorization Act, passed section 1021, entitled “Affirmation of 
Authority of the Armed Forces of the United States to Detain 
																																																																																																																																
10, 2013) (“We have looked at the future and expect a future of protracted 
confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors who will use violence to 
achieve political, religious, and other ideological ends.”). 
 95. Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). 
 96. See Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of 
Military Force, and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 113th Cong. (2013) (describing various views on 
the current utility of the AUMF); see also Joseph Straw, Most of Al Qaeda’s Big 
Names Have Been Either Captured or Killed, But Some Remain, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 
July 21, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/al-qaeda-decimated-
obliterated-article-1.1405185.  Notable al-Qaeda groups are located in Yemen, 
Somalia, and a host of African countries. See JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., AL QAEDA AND AFFILIATES: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, GLOBAL PRESENCE, 
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 14–15, 19–22, 23–25 (2011); The State of Al-
Qaeda: The Unquenchable Fire, ECONOMIST (Sept. 28, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21586834-adaptable-and-resilient-al-qaeda-
and-its-allies-keep-bouncing-back-unquenchable-fire.  Beginning with the U.S. war in 
Iraq, al-Qaeda focused considerable efforts there, which have continued to this day. 
See Ashish Kumar Se, Al Qaeda Drives Iraq Toward Chaos; U.S. Withdrawal Left 
Door Open to Sectarian Battle for Power, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2013, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/8/al-qaeda-drives-iraq-toward-
chaos/#ixzz2d5ArhMBo.  And al-Qaeda’s presence in the civil war in Syria continues 
to grow. David Ignatius, Al-Qaeda Affiliate Playing Larger Role in Syria Rebellion, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
partisan/post/al-qaeda-affiliate-playing-larger-role-in-syria-
rebellion/2012/11/30/203d06f4-3b2e-11e2-9258-ac7c78d5c680_blog.html. 
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Covered Persons Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force.”97  Under § 1021: 
a) IN GENERAL.—Congress affirms that the authority of the 
President to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40; 50 
U.S.C. 1541 note) includes the authority for the Armed Forces of 
the United States to detain covered persons (as defined in 
subsection (b)) pending disposition under the law of war. 
(b) COVERED PERSONS.-A covered person under this section is 
any person as follows: 
(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored 
those responsible for those attacks. 
(2) A person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, 
the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities 
against the United States or its coalition partners, including any 
person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly 
supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces. 
(c) DISPOSITION UNDER LAW OF WAR.-The disposition of a 
person under the law of war as described in subsection (a) may 
include the following: 
(1) Detention under the law of war without trial until the end of the 
hostilities authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force. 
(2) Trial under chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code (as 
amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (title XVIII of 
Public Law 111-84)).98 
Section 1021 expands several aspects of the AUMF.  Members of 
al-Qaeda and the Taliban remain “covered persons,” and § 1021 adds 
non-members who “substantially support” and forces associated with, 
al-Qaeda and the Taliban.99  The definitions or parameters of 
substantial support and associated forces remain unclear. 
Section 1021 makes clear that detention of covered persons may be 
without trial and last until the “end of the hostilities authorized by the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force.”100  But as discussed 
previously, the hostilities that the AUMF authorized were against 
																																																																																																																																
 97. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 
§ 1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. § 1021(b). 
 100. Id. § 1021(c)(1). 
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those who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 9/11 attacks 
or harbored them.101  While § 1021 gives the impression that there is a 
temporal limitation on its detention provisions, the United States will 
never capture or kill everyone associated with 9/11.  Given that is how 
long the § 1021 detention authority lasts, its provisions, absent repeal 
or modification, should be treated as operative for decades to come.  
And while the AUMF is retrospective in sense of the 9/11 attacks 
which had already occurred, the stated purpose of the AUMF is “to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United 
States by such nations, organizations or persons.”102  Such a purpose, 
laudable that it is, is aspirational and seems completely, perpetually, 
open-ended. 
A collection of journalists challenged the constitutionality of § 
1021, claiming that § (b)(2)’s reference to “substantial support” was 
impermissibly vague and violated their First and Fifth Amendment 
Rights.103  A federal district court agreed and issued a preliminary 
injunction enjoining the U.S. government from enforcing § 1021.104  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the 
injunction.105  The court held that § 1021 “says nothing about the 
government’s ability to detain citizens,” thus disposing of the citizen 
plaintiffs, and that the non-citizen plaintiff’s lacked standing.106  
Ultimately, the court ruled: 
With respect to individuals who are not citizens, are not lawful 
resident aliens, and are not captured or arrested within the United 
States, the President’s AUMF authority includes the authority to 
detain those responsible for 9/11 as well as those who were a part of, 
or substantially supported, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated 
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners—a detention authority that Section 1021 
concludes was granted by the original AUMF.  But with respect to 
																																																																																																																																
 101. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 
115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). 
 102. Id. (emphasis added). 
 103. Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331 (KFB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68683, at 
*34 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012).  The plaintiffs’ concerns, at least in part, stemmed from 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. Id. at *14–15.  There, the Supreme Court ruled 
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was not void for vagueness. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 
(2010). 
 104. Hedges v. Obama, 890 F. Supp. 2d 424, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 105. Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 205 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 106. Id. at 204–05. 
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citizens, lawful resident aliens, or individuals captured or arrested in 
the United States, Section 1021 simply says nothing at all.107 
The result is that at a minimum, there is a category of individuals 
(non-citizens) who are not lawful resident aliens and not captured or 
arrested within the United States for whom indefinite detention 
and/or trial by military commission is possible.  The court did not say 
other categories (citizens, lawful resident aliens, those captured in the 
United States) could not be indefinitely detained but that § 1021 is 
silent.108 
Because the government may now indefinitely incapacitate and/or 
try at least certain terror crime suspects via military commission, the 
Quarles balance has been fundamentally altered.  The possibility of 
indefinite detention and/or trial by military commission results in the 
government no longer having to choose between public safety and 
prosecution. Indeed, the government has essentially acknowledged as 
much.  As the former Attorney General explained: 
The United States has every right to capture and detain enemy 
combatants in this conflict, and need not simply release them to the 
battlefield . . . . We have every right to prevent them from returning 
to kill our troops or those fighting with us, and to target innocent 
civilians.  And this detention often yields valuable intelligence about 
the intentions, organization, operations, and tactics of our enemy.  
In short, detaining dangerous enemy combatants is lawful, and 
makes our Nation safer. 
. . . . 
[T]o suggest that the government must charge detainees with crimes 
or release them is to seriously misunderstand the principal reasons 
why we detain enemy combatants in the first place: it has to do with 
self-protection, because these are dangerous people who pose 
threats to our citizens and to our soldiers.109 
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The former Attorney General was referring to “enemy 
combatants” in his remarks.110  And while the terms enemy combatant 
and indefinite detention evoke foreigners and far off battlefields to 
some, as the article noted at the outset they have been hurled, 
however incorrectly, at U.S. citizens and for actions taken in the 
United States.  The authority to indefinitely detain may lie dormant, 
for a time, but its significance should not be overlooked. 
If—and realistically when—the Taliban, al-Qaeda or associated 
forces conduct another terrorist attack in the United States, and 
particularly one causing substantial loss of life, there will already be a 
statute which on its face allows for their indefinite detention.  Future 
attacks are inevitable—as is the pressure to invoke the alternative 
incapacitation option, indefinite detention. 
The existence of this indefinite detention option therefore 
undermines the Quarles equation.  Expanding the public safety 
exception to apply to certain terrorist suspects is therefore necessary 
to preserve the balance between the need to ensure an effective 
response to an imminent public danger and protection of the criminal 
suspect Quarles was intended to achieve. 
IV.  RECONCILING AN EXPANDED QUARLES EXCEPTION WITH 
MIRANDA 
Any proposed expansion of the Quarles PSE will inevitably be 
scrutinized against the underlying purpose of Miranda itself.  Indeed, 
Justice O’Conner’s dissent in Quarles exposed the inherent 
inconsistency between the Miranda ruling and the very notion of an 
“exception” to that ruling.111  Thus, while the PSE is now a firmly 
rooted exception to Miranda, it is the narrow nature of that exception 
that arguably led the Quarles majority to reject O’Conner’s 
argument.  Each step of expansion, however, ostensibly exacerbates 
the inconsistency highlighted by Justice O’Conner. 
A. The Evolution of the Miranda Rule: Focusing on the Core 
Concern of the Risk of Police Calculation 
There has been an undeniable shift in the Court’s treatment of 
Miranda since Quarles was decided, a shift that suggests a much more 
significant tolerance for tailoring the impact of the Miranda rule to 
the realities of investigatory necessities.  Indeed, almost as soon as 
Miranda was decided, the Supreme Court began to dilute the broad 
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 111. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 670–72 (1984) (O’Connor, J. Dissenting). 
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sweep of the warning and waiver requirement.  This was 
accomplished through a chain of decisions interpreting the meaning 
of key components of the Miranda decision, including the meaning of 
custody,112 interrogation,113 voluntary waiver,114 and the consequence 
of a violation itself.115 
Ironically, in Oregon v. Elstadt, Justice O’Connor authored what 
was perhaps the most profound manifestation of the Court’s 
conclusion that Miranda, as originally conceived, was constitutionally 
overbroad. 116  In Elstad, the Court concluded that the “[t]he Miranda 
exclusionary rule . . . serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more 
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.”117  Accordingly, the Court 
rejected the assertion that a Miranda violation constitutes a 
“poisoned tree” for purposes of derivative fruits admissibility analysis 
because a Miranda violation was not ipso facto a constitutional 
violation, but instead merely the violation of a Court imposed 
“prophylactic” intended to protect the core constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination.118 
																																																																																																																																
 112. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (holding that Miranda 
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no actual infringement of the suspect’s constitutional rights, the case was not 
controlled by the doctrine expressed in Wong Sun that fruits of a 
constitutional violation must be suppressed. 
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As a result of these decisions, the impact of Miranda on law 
enforcement questioning is much narrower today than when the rule 
was first imposed, and each of these cases reflects the willingness of 
the Court to engage in pragmatic tailoring of the rule.  It is true that 
the Court did ultimately uphold Miranda when faced with a direct 
challenge to the ruling in Dickerson.119  Even that decision, however, 
expressly indicated that the continued vitality of Miranda is in large 
part the result of the fact that it has been tailored to more effectively 
balance the needs of law enforcement with the core protection it 
sought to enhance.  According to Justice Rehnquist, “our subsequent 
cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law 
enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling that 
unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the 
prosecution’s case in chief.”120  Accordingly, while the Dickerson 
decision saved Miranda from ultimate demise, the nature of the 
protection for criminal suspects it saved was far more restrictive than 
that provided by the original Miranda decision. 
Based on this tailoring trend, it is well within the realm of reason to 
anticipate that the Court would be inclined to support an extension of 
the PSE to address a genuine risk of imminent terrorist attack.  
Questioning motivated by preventing such an attack would be within 
the logical scope of the PSE.  This motivation would ostensibly 
mitigate the risk that police agents would utilize the strategies that led 
the Miranda Court to impose the warning and waiver requirement to 
ensure a voluntary relinquishment of the Fifth Amendment privilege.  
Such questioning would also serve a compelling public interest 
distinct from merely discovering evidence for use against the suspect 
at trial. 
B. Other Indicators of the Valid Influence of the Terrorism 
Threat: The Special Needs Doctrine Analogy 
This latter aspect of an expanded PSE—justifying an exception to 
the normally applicable restriction on law enforcement activities 
when the primary purpose of those activities is not to discover 
evidence, but to protect the public from an imminent public danger—
finds support by analogy in the special needs exception to the warrant 
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inapplicability of Wong Son poison fruit analysis to a Miranda violation. See United 
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 119. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000). 
 120. Id. at 443–44. 
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and probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment.121  While 
the special needs doctrine is limited to the Fourth Amendment and 
has never been applied in the context of police questioning, the 
underlying rationale of the doctrine does indicate a willingness of the 
Court to allow a broader scope of investigatory authority in response 
to such imminent public threats. 
In the Fourth Amendment context, the special needs doctrine 
permits the use of minimally intrusive seizures and/or searches when 
necessary to deter or detect an imminent threat to public safety, so 
long as the scope of such intrusions is narrowly tailored to the 
threat.122  In Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme 
Court extended this exception to the normal individualized suspicion 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment to sobriety checkpoints.123  
The Court concluded that the use of such checkpoints was motivated 
by a primary protective purpose, and not to search for evidence to use 
against the citizen.124 This primary purpose rationale was central to 
the Court’s subsequent decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 
where the Court rejected applicability of this exception to justify the 
use of drug detection checkpoints on public roads.125 
According to the Court, the key distinction between Sitz and 
Edmond was that in Edmond, the police objective was 
indistinguishable from the routine law enforcement objective of 
searching for criminal evidence.126  In contrast, in Sitz the primary 
objective was not to search for evidence, but to protect the public 
from a serious danger.127  Thus, in the context of search and seizure 
law, the Court has created a somewhat ironic “evidentiary use” 
equation: if police conduct a suspicionless search or seizure for the 
purpose of discovering evidence, it is a traditional “evidentiary” 
search triggering the individualized suspicion requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment.  As a result, if police are successful, the evidence 
they discover may not be used in court because the lack of 
individualized suspicion renders the intrusion a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.  However, if the primary police objective is not 
to find evidence, but instead to avert an imminent and serious public 
																																																																																																																																
 121. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 122. See generally City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2002); Mich. Dep’t 
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
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danger, the individualized suspicion requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment is inapplicable.  As a result, any evidence they do 
discover may be used in court even though they lacked individualized 
suspicion. 
The theory behind proposals for expanding the PSE to facilitate 
police questioning of terrorist suspects for the purpose of averting an 
imminent terrorist attack seems identical to the justification for the 
special needs doctrine.  Unlike normal custodial interrogation, this 
type of questioning is not primarily intended to solve suspected crime 
and obtain a confession for use against the suspect.  Instead, these are 
secondary byproducts of questioning motivated by a legitimate desire 
to protect the public from imminent threat.  This common rationale 
seems to be an even more compelling justification for expanding the 
PSE.  The PSE is premised in part on an analogous theory: that the 
desire to avert an imminent public danger mitigates the risk of the 
type of calculated police tactics that necessitated the imposition of the 
Miranda warning and waiver requirement.128 
This element of the PSE and the special needs doctrine also reveals 
what seems to be an equally significant aspect of both exceptions: the 
unwillingness of the Supreme Court to subject law enforcement 
personnel charged with protecting the public with a Hobson’s Choice 
between ensuring evidence admissibility or protecting the public.  In 
cases ranging from Quarles to Sitz to Terry v. Ohio, the Court has 
consistently demonstrated a willingness to balance the limits it 
imposes on police investigatory methods with the pragmatic realities 
of pressures confronted by law enforcement when dealing with an 
imminent public danger.129  The Court’s assessment in Terry of the 
limited efficacy of rules that fail to take these pressures into account130 
serves as an important reminder that this Hobson’s Choice will almost 
always be resolved in favor of self-protection or protection of the 
public.  As a result, law enforcement officers must remain cognizant 
of the distinction between intrusions conducted for the purpose of 
gathering evidence, and those conducted for the distinct purpose of 
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protecting officers or the public from imminent danger, and that an 
inflexible approach to such realities ultimately undermines respect for 
the law: 
 The exclusionary rule has its limitations, however, as a tool of 
judicial control.  It cannot properly be invoked to exclude the 
products of legitimate police investigative techniques on the ground 
that much conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted 
intrusions upon constitutional protections.  Moreover, in some 
contexts, the rule is ineffective as a deterrent.  Street encounters 
between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity.  
They range from wholly friendly exchanges of pleasantries or 
mutually useful information to hostile confrontations of armed men 
involving arrests, or injuries, or loss of life.  Moreover, hostile 
confrontations are not all of a piece.  Some of them begin in a 
friendly enough manner, only to take a different turn upon the 
injection of some unexpected element into the conversation.  
Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of purposes, 
some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for 
crime.  Doubtless some police “field interrogation” conduct violates 
the Fourth Amendment.  But a stern refusal by this Court to 
condone such activity does not necessarily render it responsive to 
the exclusionary rule.  Regardless of how effective the rule may be 
where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police, 
it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are 
willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some 
other goal.131 
This certainly did not indicate that the Court would simply adopt 
interpretations of the Fourth (and by implication the Fifth) 
Amendment based solely on the interests of law enforcement.  It did, 
however, indicate that where police intrusions were motivated by a 
genuine safety objective, the law must respond to ensure a pragmatic 
balance between the interests implicated by such intrusions. 
The compelling government interest associated with protecting the 
public from imminent terrorist threats, coupled with the established 
Supreme Court pattern of tailoring constitutional protections to 
accommodate this interest, supports the logic of expanding the PSE to 
cover law enforcement questioning of terrorist suspects when the 
primary purpose of such questioning is preventing an imminent 
terrorist attack.  Nevertheless, drawing from special needs 
jurisprudence, it also suggests that any such exception must be 
narrowly tailored to ensure that it is applied only to objectively 
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genuine situations of imminent terrorist threats, and that the scope of 
questioning is limited to responding to such threats. 
V.  TAILORING A TERRORISM EXPANSION OF PUBLIC SAFETY TO 
A NARROW RANGE OF CASES WHERE THE CONFESSION IS CASE 
DISPOSITIVE 
Expanding the PSE to justify all custodial interrogation of terrorist 
suspects cannot be reconciled with Miranda’s core concerns.  Such a 
blanket exception would be inconsistent with the underling rationale 
of Quarles, as well as the special needs doctrine.  Instead, any valid 
expansion must be based on two essential pillars.  First, there must be 
some method of objectively assessing the legitimacy of the asserted 
imminent public danger.  Second, the scope of unwarned questioning 
must be limited to responding to that danger. 
Imposing an objective assessment of a situation is a common 
practice in assessing police compliance with constitutional 
requirements.  In the Miranda context, for purposes of triggering the 
Miranda rule, interrogation includes, according to Rhode Island v. 
Innis, both express questioning, and “words or actions on the part of 
the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) 
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect.”132  This focus on the 
“likelihood” that police conduct will elicit an incriminating response 
requires courts to assess what an objective officer would have 
expected; the subjective expectations of the actual officer are not 
controlling.  The same objective situation assessment is inherent in 
the existing Quarles PSE exception: a judicial determination that the 
questioning was necessary to secure the safety of the officer or public 
as a predicate for exempting the questioning from the Miranda 
requirement.133 
This objective assessment is also inherent in applying the special 
needs doctrine, as illustrated by the contrasting holdings of Sitz 
(sobriety checkpoints)134 and Edmond (drug detection checkpoints).135  
In both cases, the government asserted the brief traffic stops were 
motivated by a concern for public safety.136  However, in Edmond, the 
Court rejected that assertion, concluding that the asserted 
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justification could not override the objective indicators that the drug 
stops were indistinguishable from general law enforcement stops.137 
According to the Court: 
 Petitioners propose several ways in which the narcotics-detection 
purpose of the instant checkpoint program may instead resemble the 
primary purposes of the checkpoints in Sitz . . . . 
 Petitioners also emphasize the severe and intractable nature of 
the drug problem as justification for the checkpoint program. There 
is no doubt that traffic in illegal narcotics creates social harms of the 
first magnitude . . . . But the gravity of the threat alone cannot be 
dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement 
officers may employ to pursue a given purpose.  Rather, in 
determining whether individualized suspicion is required, we must 
consider the nature of the interests threatened and their connection 
to the particular law enforcement practices at issue.  We are 
particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the general rule of 
individualized suspicion where governmental authorities primarily 
pursue their general crime control ends.138 
Similar objective “gate keeping” assessments must be built into any 
expansion of the PSE.  Courts must be empowered to assess the 
objective validity of an asserted imminent terrorist threat.  They 
should only allow use of statements obtained pursuant to the 
exception when it is established by the government that a reasonable 
officer would have expected that a failure to immediately question a 
suspect without first obtaining a Miranda waiver would subject the 
public to imminent danger of death, great bodily harm, or serious 
property damage.  As with other reasonableness assessments, the 
officer should not be required to be accurate.  Instead, so long as the 
judgment of imminent threat was reasonable, the exception should be 
validated.  However, relying exclusively on the interrogating officer’s 
subjective perceptions should be regarded as insufficient.  Only when 
those perceptions can be objectively validated should the exception 
apply. 
Limiting the scope of questioning justified by the PSE should pose 
little difficulty for a reviewing court.  Only statements made in 
response to questions related to discovering and preventing the 
anticipated threat of an imminent terrorist attack would be 
admissible.  All other statements would fall outside the scope of the 
exception and be subject to the traditional Miranda warning and 
waiver requirement. 
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VI.  HOW EXPANDING THE QUARLES EXCEPTION IS A NET GAIN 
FOR TERROR SUSPECTS: INCENTIVIZING THE ARTICLE III 
PROSECUTION OPTION 
Any expansion of the PSE should justifiably trigger concern that 
the Miranda decision’s core protections would be diluted.  The Court 
in Quarles chose almost thirty years ago to endorse a rule that 
balanced the authority to engage in custodial interrogation with the 
need to protect the public from imminent danger.  In the context of 
terrorism investigations, this justification seems almost more 
compelling than in the Quarles context.  Unlike the officer who 
confronted Quarles, law enforcement agents questioning a terrorist 
suspect will often be under immense pressure to respond to a threat 
that can produce much more widespread harm to the public.  Like 
Quarles, however, the nature of coordinated terrorist operations 
indicates that it will often be the case that information from the 
suspect may be the only viable means for averting this type of serious 
and widespread harm.  One need only consider the case of Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab, where federal agents sought to establish 
whether other trans-Atlantic flights en route or about to depart from 
Europe were at risk of explosion.139  Had this been the case, 
information from Abdulmutallab may have been the only way to 
avert catastrophic loss. 
This is not the only consideration that compels adopting a terrorist-
specific expansion of the PSE.  As noted previously, whatever 
dilution of a suspect’s protection from custodial interrogation that 
results from such an expansion will be offset by the decreased 
likelihood that the suspect will be transferred to military custody for 
prosecution by military commission.140  The availability of this 
alternate option for dealing with the terrorist suspect fundamentally 
alters the Hobson’s Choice equation.  Unlike the officer who 
confronted Quarles, federal agents who today confront a terror 
suspect may not perceive a choice between protecting the public or an 
ability to prosecute.141  Instead, if the PSE is unavailable in such 
situations, the choice to question in violation of Miranda will not 
necessarily foreclose subsequent use of the statement to prosecute the 
suspect.  But instead of prosecution in an Article III court, the suspect 
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may find himself transferred to military custody for prosecution 
before a military commission.142 
The availability of the alternate “terrorist suspect” response option 
of military detention must ultimately tip the balance in favor of 
expanding the PSE to address the threat of international terrorism.  
Consistent with the President’s stated objective of minimizing 
reliance on military custody and trial by military commission,143 any 
rule that renders such disposition of a terror suspect more likely 
should be reconsidered.  That is precisely the effect of a narrow 
application of the PSE.  Only by facilitating narrowly tailored 
questioning of international terror suspects in response to an 
imminent threat of terrorist attack will the likelihood of invoking this 
third rail option be diminished.  Thus, it is the terror suspect himself 
that may actually be the primary beneficiary of an expanded PSE. 
CONCLUSION 
In Quarles, the Supreme Court eliminated the Hobson’s choice 
between ensuring public safety and ensuring admissibility of a 
suspect’s statement when responding to a situation where safety 
necessitated immediate questioning of a suspect taken into custody.144  
The Court held that a legitimate public safety concern justified an 
exception to the normal Miranda warning and waiver prerequisite for 
admissibility of such statements, but did not define the scope of the 
exception.145  While an objectively credible concern for public safety 
was an essential element of the exception, it remained unclear 
whether only the type of spontaneous questioning that occurred in 
Quarles fell within the exception, or whether it extended to longer-
term and more calculated questioning. 
This uncertainty was starkly exposed when the government 
invoked the PSE to justify extended questioning of Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab after he was taken into custody following his failed 
attempt to destroy a trans-Atlantic commercial airliner.  Applying the 
Quarles PSE to extended questioning of terror suspects should trigger 
criticism that this extension exceeds the scope of the PSE.  Extended 
questioning is anything but spontaneous, and therefore extending the 
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exception to such situations unjustifiably dilutes Miranda protections 
for these suspects. 
Critics of expanding the PSE fail to adequately consider the impact 
of the military incapacitation option for suspected terrorist 
operatives.  This option has altered the balance of interests central to 
a narrow application of the PSE.  Restricting the scope of the PSE to 
questioning (such as that in Quarles) will not necessarily accrue to 
suspects’ benefit the way it did before the “War on Terror”.  Instead, 
such a restriction may compel the government to avoid the civilian 
criminal prosecution option altogether, and avoid all Miranda-related 
concerns by invoking the military incapacitation option. 
The aftermath of a terrorist attack is chaotic and emotionally 
charged, and is exactly when clear rules for questioning suspects—and 
sanctions for over reaching—are needed most.  The possibility of 
military detention—whether on a U.S. Navy warship or while in a 
Boston hospital bed—undermines the risk associated with a narrow 
application of the PSE.  In the normal criminal investigation, a 
narrow application of the PSE would not tolerate long-term 
questioning of a suspect.  Instead, police would have to choose 
between questioning without complying with Miranda and forfeiting 
the ability to use a suspect’s statements, or complying with Miranda 
and losing potentially invaluable information.  However, when the 
suspect is an individual who may be designated an enemy combatant 
and subjected to military detention and trial by commission, the 
choice is no longer binary.  Instead, the government may invoke a 
third option: conduct long-duration questioning without complying 
with Miranda, obtain the information deemed necessary, and then 
incapacitate the suspect by designating him an enemy belligerent.  As 
a result, an expanded application of the PSE may actually be in the 
suspect’s best interest because it will incentivize reliance on the 
civilian criminal process. 
The risk that the military incapacitation option may gain 
momentum in response to a future terrorist threat is not hypothetical.  
Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine an aggressive use of this option in 
response to another major terrorist attack on the nation.  It is 
therefore essential to consider this possibility when assessing the 
relative risks and rewards associated with the scope of the PSE.  
Doing so in the calm light of day—before the next incident increases 
the calls for military detention of terrorism suspects—will facilitate a 
credible balance between the interests that lie at the core of the 
exception.  Ultimately, expanding the scope of the PSE in certain 
counterterrorism investigations will incentivize normal law 
enforcement disposition.  Expanding the PSE exception will also 
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inure to the terrorism suspect’s benefit by increasing the probability 
that his case will be adjudicated in an Article III court, mitigating the 
risk of indefinite military detention. 
